论文标题
快速还是便宜？动态市场的打破点
Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们检查了两侧市场随着时间的流逝而随机到达的两侧市场，并从类型的连续体中汲取灵感。匹配客户和提供商的成本各不相同，因此社交计划者面临两个争夺目标：a）在匹配之前减少玩家的等待时间； b）为了降低匹配成本，形成有效的对。我们表明，这样的市场的特征是快速或廉价的困境：在大量的分配假设下，没有“免费午餐”，即没有同时在两个目标上同时最佳的清除时间表。我们进一步确定了一个独特的断裂点，这表明匹配成本的急剧降低与等待时间的增加形成对比。概括该模型，我们确定了两个政权：一个，没有免费午餐的地方；另一个，机会之窗打开以获得免费的午餐。值得注意的是，在这种情况下，贪婪的调度绝不是最佳的。
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to form efficient pairs in order to reduce matching costs. We show that such markets are characterized by a quick-or-cheap dilemma: Under a large class of distributional assumptions, there is no 'free lunch', i.e., there exists no clearing schedule that is simultaneously optimal along both objectives. We further identify a unique breaking point signifying a stark reduction in matching cost contrasted by an increase in waiting time. Generalizing this model, we identify two regimes: one, where no free lunch exists; the other, where a window of opportunity opens to achieve a free lunch. Remarkably, greedy scheduling is never optimal in this setting.
