论文标题
通过有限时间保证的充血游戏的动态定价，资源感知控制
Resource-Aware Control via Dynamic Pricing for Congestion Game with Finite-Time Guarantees
论文作者
论文摘要
拥堵游戏是现代网络应用程序广泛使用的模型。这种应用程序中的一个核心问题是，参与者的自私行为可能会导致系统参与者的资源超载和负面外部性。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种定价机制，可以保证时间累积违反资源负荷限制的次线性增加。我们方法的特征在于，它以资源为中心的意义上，它取决于资源的拥塞状态，而不是系统参与者的特定特征。此功能使我们的机制可扩展，灵活和保护。此外，我们通过数值模拟表明，我们的定价机制对代理人的福利没有显着影响，与提高违规能力的情况相反。
Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system participants. In this work, we propose a pricing mechanism that guarantees the sub-linear increase of the time-cumulative violation of the resource load constraints. The feature of our method is that it is resource-centric in the sense that it depends on the congestion state of the resources and not on specific characteristics of the system participants. This feature makes our mechanism scalable, flexible, and privacy-preserving. Moreover, we show by numerical simulations that our pricing mechanism has no significant effect on the agents' welfare in contrast to the improvement of the capacity violation.
