论文标题
管道网络容量的凸组合拍卖
Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network Capacities
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出了一种分配管道容量的机制，假设参与者竞标能力确实对各种网络路线具有主观评估。所提出的机制基于竞标路线的概念。每个参与者都定义了有限数量的路线，并在每个路线上都放置了对应于各种数量的多个出价。提出的机制将提交的投标的凸组合分配给每个参与者，因此称为凸组合拍卖。拟议模型中的容量支付是根据Vickrey-Clarke-Groves原理确定的。我们将所提出的算法的效率与当前用于管道容量分配的方法的简化模型（同时升级时钟拍卖管道容量）通过模拟，例如根据各种措施，例如导致玩家的实用性，网络能力的利用，网络能力的利用率，Auctioneer的总收入和公平。
In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of bidding for route-quantity pairs. Each participant defines a limited number of routes and places multiple bids, corresponding to various quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mechanism assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its called convex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model are determined according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle. We compare the efficiency of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the method currently used for pipeline capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneous ascending clock auction of pipeline capacities) via simulation, according to various measures, such as resulting utility of players, utilization of network capacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.
