论文标题
经济流行病学游戏中疾病状况的自发差异
Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一场游戏，灵感来自牲畜种植中疾病管理的挑战，以及通过贸易网络传播流行疾病。该游戏的成功来自平衡购买新股票的成本与它将携带某种疾病的风险。当玩家遵循简单的基于内存的策略时，我们会观察到与相对较高或较低感染水平的玩家相对应的两组。通过对疾病的动力学以及贸易关系的形成和破裂进行建模，我们得出了这种分离作为传输速率的函数以及每个玩家可接受疾病的阈值水平的条件。当游戏中的互动仅限于在小世界网络中彼此邻居的玩家时，玩家的感染水平与邻居相似。我们得出的结论是，经济流行病学系统的成功可能源自不幸和地理环境，以及个人对风险态度的先天差异。
We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some disease. When players follow a simple memory-based strategy we observe a spontaneous separation into two groups corresponding to players with relatively high, or low, levels of infection. By modelling the dynamics of both the disease and the formation and breaking of trade relationships, we derive the conditions for which this separation occurs as a function of the transmission rate and the threshold level of acceptable disease for each player. When interactions in the game are restricted to players that neighbour each other in a small-world network, players tend to have similar levels of infection as their neighbours. We conclude that success in economic-epidemiological systems can originate from misfortune and geographical circumstances as well as by innate differences in personal attitudes towards risk.
