论文标题
世界末日：对辛普森第二个问题的回答
Doomsday: A Response to Simpson's Second Question
论文作者
论文摘要
世界末日论点（DA）引发了各种各样的观点。在这里，我解决了F. Simpson（2016）提出的一个关键问题，该问题面对了DA支持者的观点以及像我这样的人反对DA的人。我同意使用普通的频繁概率可以计算完整的空间分布中的典型位置。但是我认为，时间概率分布是未知的：我们有过去的记录，但对我们的未来一无所知。正是这种不对称性使哥白尼主义的概念及时地消除了。尽管常见的方法不适用于这种不对称情况，但确实适用了贝叶斯方法。他们表明，各种快速的厄运和遥远的厄运场景同样可能。我得出的结论是，DA没有任何预测能力。
The Doomsday Argument (DA) has sparked a variety of opinions. Here I address a key question posed by F. Simpson (2016) that confronts the views of DA proponents and those who, like me, oppose the DA. I agree that typical locations within a complete spatial distribution are calculable using ordinary frequentist probability. But I argue that the temporal probability distribution is unknown: we have records of our past yet are ignorant of our future. It is this asymmetry that upsets the idea of Copernicanism in time. Although frequentist methods do not apply to this asymmetric situation, Bayesian methods do apply. They show that the various Quick Doom and Distant Doom scenarios are equally likely. I conclude that the DA has no predictive power whatsoever.
