论文标题
基于股权的激励措施，生产/服务功能和游戏理论
Equity-Based Incentives, Production/Service Functions And Game Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
EBIS/ESO极大地改变了传统的生产/服务功能，因为ESOS/EBIS可以具有不同的心理影响（动机或动力动力），并且可以创造无形的资本和不同的经济回报。尽管游戏理论有缺陷，但它可能有助于描述ESO/EBIS交易中的相互作用。 ESOS/EBIS涉及两个阶段的游戏，并且没有两个子游戏的纳什均衡状态。这些游戏中的大量实际参与者和潜在的参与者显着使平衡的分辨率变得复杂，并增加了游戏的活力，因为玩家对此类游戏中其他人的动作更加敏感。本文：a）分析ESOS/EBI如何影响生产功能的传统假设（在制造业和服务领域），b）使用游戏理论概念分析ESOS/EBIS交易，c）说明了游戏理论的一些局限性。
EBIs/ESOs substantially change the traditional production/service function because ESOs/EBIs can have different psychological effects(motivation or de-motivation), and can create intangible capital and different economic payoffs. Although Game Theory is flawed, it can be helpful in describing interactions in ESO/EBIs transactions. ESOs/EBIs involve two-stage games and there are no perfect Nash Equilibria for the two sub-games. The large number of actual and potential participants in these games significantly complicates resolution of equilibria and increases the dynamism of the games given that players are more sensitive to other peoples moves in such games. This article: a) analyzes how ESOs/EBIs affect traditional assumptions of production functions (in both the manufacturing and service sectors), b) analyzes ESOs/EBIs transactions using game theory concepts, c) illustrates some of the limitations of game theory.
