论文标题
离散时间线性二次随机动态游戏的协方差转向
Covariance Steering for Discrete-Time Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Dynamic Games
论文作者
论文摘要
本文解决了将离散时间线性动力学系统从初始高斯分布转向游戏理论环境中最终分布的问题。两名球员中的一位努力最大程度地减少二次收益,同时试图在最后一步时满足给定的平均值和协方差约束。另一个玩家可以最大化相同的收益,但假定它对终端约束无关。首先,检查了游戏的不受约束版本,并获得了鞍点存在的必要条件。然后,我们证明不能保证为单面约束动态游戏获得解决方案,随后对玩家的最佳响应进行了分析。最后,我们建议使用Jacobi迭代方法在数值上解决在对抗场景下转向分布的问题。选择在最后游戏期间引导导弹的问题是为了分析提出的方法。还包括与未实现终端分布的情况相对应的数值模拟,并讨论满足终端约束的必要条件。
This paper addresses the problem of steering a discrete-time linear dynamical system from an initial Gaussian distribution to a final distribution in a game-theoretic setting. One of the two players strives to minimize a quadratic payoff, while at the same time tries to meet a given mean and covariance constraint at the final time-step. The other player maximizes the same payoff, but it is assumed to be indifferent to the terminal constraint. At first, the unconstrained version of the game is examined, and the necessary conditions for the existence of a saddle point are obtained. We then show that obtaining a solution for the one-sided constrained dynamic game is not guaranteed, and subsequently the players' best responses are analyzed. Finally, we propose to numerically solve the problem of steering the distribution under adversarial scenarios using the Jacobi iteration method. The problem of guiding a missile during the endgame is chosen to analyze the proposed approach. A numerical simulation corresponding to the case where the terminal distribution is not achieved is also included, and discuss the necessary conditions to meet the terminal constraint.