论文标题
具有动态人群的诚实多代理顺序决策的可用性
Implementability of Honest Multi-Agent Sequential Decision-Making with Dynamic Population
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了动态环境中多代理系统的资源分配的决策机制的设计。代理商对资源的私人观察到的偏好会随着时间的流逝而不断发展，由于采用了停止规则，人口是动态的。提出的模型通过指定分配规则和三个付款规则来设计参与动态机制的代理商的相遇规则，以引发代理人在多个时期内的诚实偏好报告和最佳停止的耦合决策。该机制提供了一项特殊的张贴付款规则，仅取决于每个代理商的停止时间直接影响人口动态。这封信的重点是完美的贝叶斯纳什均衡中规则的理论实施性，并表征了必要和足够的条件，以保证代理人在时期内的诚实平衡行为。我们提供设计原则，以根据分配规则来构建付款，并确定设计师影响人口动态的能力的限制。既定条件使设计人员找到多个规则以确定最佳分配规则的问题。
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the adoption of stopping rules. The proposed model designs the rules of encounter for agents participating in the dynamic mechanism by specifying an allocation rule and three payment rules to elicit agents' coupled decision makings of honest preference reporting and optimal stopping over multiple periods. The mechanism provides a special posted-price payment rule that depends only on each agent's realized stopping time to directly influence the population dynamics. This letter focuses on the theoretical implementability of the rules in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee agents' honest equilibrium behaviors over periods. We provide the design principles to construct the payments in terms of the allocation rules and identify the restrictions of the designer's ability to influence the population dynamics. The established conditions make the designer's problem of finding multiple rules to determine an optimal allocation rule.
