论文标题
居民匹配的游戏理论后果
Game Theoretic Consequences of Resident Matching
论文作者
论文摘要
SF Match和National Residency Match计划（NRMP）目前使用的居民匹配算法Gale-Shapley已经使用了50多年，而没有进行任何基本更改。该算法是一种有利于申请人结果的“稳定婚姻”方法。但是，在这50年中，申请人和计划的供应和需求发生了很大变化。这些变化以及比赛的实施方式引起了申请人之间昂贵的比赛，以尽可能多的计划申请和面试。同时，计划通过采访尽可能多的候选人来最大程度地提高其匹配的可能性，因此也会产生高昂的成本。
The resident matching algorithm, Gale-Shapley, currently used by SF Match and the National Residency Match Program (NRMP), has been in use for over 50 years without fundamental alteration. The algorithm is a 'stable-marriage' method that favors applicant outcomes. However, in these 50 years, there has been a big shift in the supply and demand of applicants and programs. These changes along with the way the Match is implemented have induced a costly race among applicants to apply and interview at as many programs as possible. Meanwhile programs also incur high costs as they maximize their probability of matching by interviewing as many candidates as possible.
