论文标题
$μ$瓷砖：有效的内部系统内存范围内存区域的特权
$μ$Tiles: Efficient Intra-Process Privilege Enforcement of Memory Regions
论文作者
论文摘要
随着对互联设备的安全咨询和隐私问题的惊人速度，迫切需要在资源约束的设备中有强大的隔离保证，这些设备需要非常轻巧的解决方案。但是，现状是类似于Unix的操作系统在过程中没有提供特权分离。在共享地址空间内缺乏实用的细粒度分区化，这会导致通过应用程序的不信任依赖项和折衷的线程泄漏私人数据。为此，我们提出了$μ$ tiles，轻巧的内核抽象和基于对程序内特权分离，内存保护和安全的多线程的相互不信任的安全性原始图。 $μ$瓷砖利用硬件支持用于虚拟内存标记（例如，手臂存储域），以实现显着的性能增益，同时消除各种硬件限制。我们的结果（基于OpenSSL，Apache HTTP服务器和LevelDB）表明，对于物联网用例，$μ$ tiles非常轻巧（向内核映像中添加$ \ 10kb $）。它添加了可忽略的运行时开销（$ \ $ \ BOUD 0.5 \％-3.5 \％$），并且易于与现有应用程序集成以提供强大的特权分离。
With the alarming rate of security advisories and privacy concerns on connected devices, there is an urgent need for strong isolation guarantees in resource-constrained devices that demand very lightweight solutions. However, the status quo is that Unix-like operating systems do not offer privilege separation inside a process. Lack of practical fine-grained compartmentalization inside a shared address space leads to private data leakage through applications' untrusted dependencies and compromised threads. To this end, we propose $μ$Tiles, a lightweight kernel abstraction and set of security primitives based on mutual distrust for intra-process privilege separation, memory protection, and secure multithreading. $μ$Tiles takes advantage of hardware support for virtual memory tagging (e.g., ARM memory domains) to achieve significant performance gain while eliminating various hardware limitations. Our results (based on OpenSSL, the Apache HTTP server, and LevelDB) show that $μ$Tiles is extremely lightweight (adds $\approx 10KB$ to kernel image) for IoT use cases. It adds negligible runtime overhead ($\approx 0.5\%-3.5\%$) and is easy to integrate with existing applications for providing strong privilege separation.
