论文标题
混合甘露的公平划分中的嫉妒和其他共同特性
Jealousy-freeness and other common properties in Fair Division of Mixed Manna
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑一个公平的划分环境，将不可分割的物品分配给代理商。设置中的每个代理对于每个项目都有严格的负，零或严格的正效用。因此，我们在某些特工（即混合）中对某些代理有利的项目有所区别，对每个人（即商品）有益或对每个人有害（即坏人）。对于此模型，我们研究了分配的公理概念，例如嫉妒性，最多可嫉妒一项，最多是一件项目和帕累托（Pareto）。对于这些特性的组合，我们获得了许多新的可能性和不可能结果。我们还研究了与此类组合有关的新计算任务。因此，我们推进了混合甘露的公平划分的最先进。
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good for some agents and bad for other agents (i.e. mixed), good for everyone (i.e. goods) or bad for everyone (i.e. bads). For this model, we study axiomatic concepts of allocations such as jealousy-freeness up to one item, envy-freeness up to one item and Pareto-optimality. We obtain many new possibility and impossibility results in regard to combinations of these properties. We also investigate new computational tasks related to such combinations. Thus, we advance the state-of-the-art in fair division of mixed manna.
