论文标题
信仰平均相对功利主义
Belief-Averaged Relative Utilitarianism
论文作者
论文摘要
当个人代理人的偏好和社会的偏好最大化野蛮传统中的主观预期效用时，我们会考虑社会福利的功能。引入了一个公理系统，其独特的解决方案是平均代理商的信念并总结其效用功能的社会福利功能，并归一化以具有相同的范围。第一个区别公理需要对社会偏好与代理人对信仰同意的行为的偏好的积极联系。第二个是对仅适用于非冗余行为的无关替代方案的独立性的削弱。
We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare function that averages the agents' beliefs and sums up their utility functions, normalized to have the same range. The first distinguishing axiom requires positive association of society's preferences with the agents' preferences for acts about which beliefs agree. The second is a weakening of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives that only applies to non-redundant acts.
