论文标题
1900年左右德国物理学的事实概念：马赫和爱因斯坦之间的比较
The Concept of Fact in German Physics around 1900: A Comparison between Mach and Einstein
论文作者
论文摘要
事实的概念有历史。在过去的几个世纪中，物理学家以各种方式对其进行了使用。在本文中，我们比较了恩斯特·马赫（Ernst Mach）和阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦（Albert Einstein）对该概念的解释。马赫（Mach）和大多数十九世纪的物理学家一样，将事实与理论形成鲜明对比。他将事实理解为自然事件的真实而复杂的组合。反过来，理论只能有效地订购和传达事实。爱因斯坦的事实概念与马赫的概念不相容，因为爱因斯坦认为事实也可能是理论上的，就像他将数学理论化在代表现实中的主要作用一样。例如，他使用事实概念来指代经验的普遍有效结果。我们在马赫和爱因斯坦之间披露的差异对于德国物理学科中更广泛的紧张局势是象征性的。此外，它们强调了该事实类别的历史流动性，无论是在物理学和其他方面。
The concept of fact has a history. Over the past centuries, physicists have appropriated it in various ways. In this article, we compare Ernst Mach and Albert Einstein's interpretations of the concept. Mach, like most nineteenth-century physicists, contrasted fact and theory. He understood facts as real and complex combinations of natural events. Theories, in turn, only served to order and communicate facts efficiently. Einstein's concept of fact was incompatible with Mach's, since Einstein believed facts could be theoretical too, just as he ascribed mathematical theorizing a leading role in representing reality. For example, he used the concept of fact to refer to a generally valid result of experience. The differences we disclose between Mach and Einstein were symbolic for broader tensions in the German physics discipline. Furthermore, they underline the historically fluid character of the category of the fact, both within physics and beyond.
