论文标题
有效的民主决策通过非确定的比例共识
Efficient democratic decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus
论文作者
论文摘要
（i）是否有投票方法，包括少数群体，即使选民采取战略行动，（ii）促进共识而不是两极分化和不平等，并且（iii）不利于现状或过分依赖机会？ 我们通过描述两种非确定投票方法来证明答案是肯定的，一种基于对彩票的自动讨价还价，另一个基于批准折衷选择的条件承诺。我们的理论分析和基于代理的仿真实验表明，对于这些方法，大多数人不能像确定性方法一样始终如一地抑制少数族裔，现状的支持者不能像基于共识的方法一样阻止决策，而所得的汇总福利与现有方法相当，而对于其他非确定方法，平均随机性比现有方法可比。
Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on chance? We show the answer is yes by describing two nondeterministic voting methods, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Our theoretical analysis and agent-based simulation experiments suggest that with these, majorities cannot consistently suppress minorities as with deterministic methods, proponents of the status quo cannot block decisions as in consensus-based approaches, the resulting aggregate welfare is comparable to existing methods, and average randomness is lower than for other nondeterministic methods.
