论文标题
与私人说谎成本的重复交流
Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost
论文作者
论文摘要
我研究了患者发件人和一系列接收器之间的重复通信游戏。发件人对他的撒谎的心理成本具有持久的私人信息，并且在每个时期内都可以私下观察I.I.D.的实现。沟通之前的状态。我表征了每种类型的发件人的最高均衡收益。当支持接收者先前的信念的最高谎言成本接近发件人的利益时，在重复的通信游戏中，每种类型的最高均衡收益都会收敛于他的均衡收益，以一次性的贝叶斯说服游戏。我还表明，在每个发件人最佳的平衡中，在说实话和躺在每个历史上都没有类型的发件人混合。当存在其谎言成本超过其利益的道德类型时，我为所有非伦理类型发件人提供必要的条件，以获得其最佳承诺收益。我确定了外部期权效应，道德的可能性会降低每种非伦理类型的回报。
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an i.i.d. state before communication takes place. I characterize every type of sender's highest equilibrium payoff. When the highest lying cost in the support of the receivers' prior belief approaches the sender's benefit from lying, every type's highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated communication game converges to his equilibrium payoff in a one-shot Bayesian persuasion game. I also show that in every sender-optimal equilibrium, no type of sender mixes between telling the truth and lying at every history. When there exist ethical types whose lying costs outweigh their benefits, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all non-ethical type senders to attain their optimal commitment payoffs. I identify an outside option effect through which the possibility of being ethical decreases every non-ethical type's payoff.
