论文标题
海上容器终端软件系统的深入安全评估
An In-Depth Security Assessment of Maritime Container Terminal Software Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
对软件系统的攻击每天都会针对个人,公司和政府进行全世界。促进海上运输的系统有严重破坏的风险,这些干扰可能源于这些系统中使用的软件和流程的脆弱性。这些漏洞将这样的系统敞开命中,向网络攻击。对海事运输系统安全性的评估集中在确定风险上,但并未采取实际识别这些系统中存在的漏洞的关键(且昂贵)的下一步。尽管此类风险评估很重要,但他们尚未提供控制这些端口及其终端的系统中安全问题的详细标识。作为回应,我们在经验丰富的学术网络安全团队与管理海上运输的著名商业软件提供商之间建立了一个关键的合作。我们对海上运输过程中涉及的信息流进行了分析,然后对管理货运系统的软件进行了深入的漏洞评估。在本文中,我们显示了货运运输过程中涉及的信息流,并解释了我们如何进行深入评估,总结了我们的发现。像每个大型软件系统一样,海上运输系统都有漏洞。
Attacks on software systems occur world-wide on a daily basis targeting individuals, corporations, and governments alike. The systems that facilitate maritime shipping are at risk of serious disruptions, and these disruptions can stem from vulnerabilities in the software and processes used in these systems. These vulnerabilities leave such systems open to cyber-attack. Assessments of the security of maritime shipping systems have focused on identifying risks but have not taken the critical (and expensive) next step of actually identifying vulnerabilities present in these systems. While such risk assessments are important, they have not provided the detailed identification of security issues in the systems that control these ports and their terminals. In response, we formed a key collaboration between an experienced academic cybersecurity team and a well-known commercial software provider that manages maritime shipping. We performed an analysis of the information flow involved in the maritime shipping process, and then executed an in-depth vulnerability assessment of the software that manages freight systems. In this paper, we show the flow of information involved in the freight shipping process and explain how we performed the in-depth assessment, summarizing our findings. Like every large software system, maritime shipping systems have vulnerabilities.