论文标题
封闭的非原子资源分配游戏
Closed Non-atomic Resource Allocation Games
论文作者
论文摘要
当需求过量超出供应时，如何通过排队等待来影响效率？我们将一类拥堵游戏类似于具有恒定质量的非原子玩家，基于对序列线性程序作为顺序资源分配游戏的表述。玩家不断选择活动，以使他们最大化线性目标解释为活动奖励的时间平移，而主动资源约束会导致排队。反过来，由此产生的等待延迟输入每个玩家的优化问题。通过与比例公平相关的潜在功能，对衣柜型平衡的存在及其性质的存在。平衡相对于最佳资源分配的效率低下是通过无政府状态的价格来表征的，如果所有玩家都具有相同的类型（如果不是$ \ infty $），则为2。
How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass, based on a formulation of generic linear programs as sequential resource allocation games. Players continuously select activities such that they maximize linear objectives interpreted as time-average of activity rewards, while active resource constraints cause queueing. In turn, the resulting waiting delays enter in the optimization problem of each player. The existence of Wardrop-type equilibria and their properties are investivated by means of a potential function related to proportional fairness. The inefficiency of the equilibria relative to optimal resource allocation is characterized through the price of anarchy which is 2 if all players are of the same type ($\infty$ if not).
