论文标题
用于在线有效和离线电动汽车向充电站的机理设计
Mechanism Design for Efficient Online and Offline Allocation of Electric Vehicles to Charging Stations
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了将电动汽车（EV）分配给充电站并安排其充电的问题。我们开发了离线和在线解决方案，这些解决方案将电动汽车用户视为旨在最大化其利润并最大程度地减少对日程安排的影响的自身利益代理。我们将最佳EV到充电站分配的问题作为混合整数编程（MIP），我们提出了两种定价机制：一种固定价格，另一个基于众所周知的Vickrey-Clark-Groves（VCG）机制。后来，我们开发了在线解决方案，这些解决方案逐步调用基于MIP的算法。我们从经验上评估了我们的机制，并且观察到这两者都可以很好地扩展。此外，VCG机制服务的平均$ 1.5 \％$ $ $ EV比固定价格高。此外，当电台交通拥堵时，VCG会导致电动汽车的价格更高，而车站的利润更高，但电动汽车的效用较低。但是，从理论上讲，我们证明了VCG机制可以保证对电动汽车偏好的真实报道。相比之下，固定价格很容易受到代理商的战略行为的影响，因为非真实的电动汽车可以代替真实的电动汽车。最后，我们观察到，在线算法平均为$ 98 \％$ $ $％的EV满意度。
We study the problem of allocating Electric Vehicles (EVs) to charging stations and scheduling their charging. We develop offline and online solutions that treat EV users as self-interested agents that aim to maximise their profit and minimise the impact on their schedule. We formulate the problem of the optimal EV to charging station allocation as a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) one and we propose two pricing mechanisms: A fixed-price one, and another that is based on the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Later, we develop online solutions that incrementally call the MIP-based algorithm. We empirically evaluate our mechanisms and we observe that both scale well. Moreover, the VCG mechanism services on average $1.5\%$ more EVs than the fixed-price one. In addition, when the stations get congested, VCG leads to higher prices for the EVs and higher profit for the stations, but lower utility for the EVs. However, we theoretically prove that the VCG mechanism guarantees truthful reporting of the EVs' preferences. In contrast, the fixed-price one is vulnerable to agents' strategic behaviour as non-truthful EVs can charge in place of truthful ones. Finally, we observe that the online algorithms are on average at $98\%$ of the optimal in EV satisfaction.
