论文标题
过去的假设和物理定律的本质
The Past Hypothesis and the Nature of Physical Laws
论文作者
论文摘要
如果过去的假设是时间箭头的基础，那么过去假设的状态是什么？在本文中，我研究了过去假设在鲍尔茨曼尼亚（Boltzmannian）叙述中的作用，并捍卫了过去的假设是自然的候选基本定律。已知这种观点与对法律的张道兼容，但是正如我认为，它也得到了最小的非人类“理事”观点的支持。一些担忧是由过去假设作为边界条件的非动力和时间依赖性特征引起的，其规范的内在模糊性以及初始概率分布的性质。我表明这些担忧并没有太多的力量，无论如何，它们在分析时间箭头的新量子框架中变得不符。因此，应该比现在更广泛地接受过去的假设是候选基本法。
If the Past Hypothesis underlies the arrows of time, what is the status of the Past Hypothesis? In this paper, I examine the role of the Past Hypothesis in the Boltzmannian account and defend the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature. Such a view is known to be compatible with Humeanism about laws, but as I argue it is also supported by a minimal non-Humean "governing" view. Some worries arise from the non-dynamical and time-dependent character of the Past Hypothesis as a boundary condition, the intrinsic vagueness in its specification, and the nature of the initial probability distribution. I show that these worries do not have much force, and in any case they become less relevant in a new quantum framework for analyzing time's arrows -- the Wentaculus. Hence, the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law should be more widely accepted than it is now.
