论文标题
V2V通信的证书和签名免费匿名
Certificate and Signature Free Anonymity for V2V Communications
论文作者
论文摘要
匿名是车辆到车辆（V2V）通信的理想功能，但它与其他要求（例如非替代和撤销）相抵触。现有的基于假名的V2V通信方案依赖于证书生成和签名验证。这些方案需要繁琐的关键管理，经常更新证书链以及其他昂贵的程序，例如加密配对。在本文中，我们介绍了提供身份验证，授权，匿名性，非替代性，重放保护，化名撤销和前进保密性的小说V2V通信计划，而无需依赖传统的证书生成和签名验证。我们计划的安全性和隐私依赖于数字理论中的严重问题。此外，我们的计划保证在勾结恶意当事方的子集存在下保证安全和隐私，但前提是此类集合的基数低于固定阈值。
Anonymity is a desirable feature for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, but it conflicts with other requirements such as non-repudiation and revocation. Existing, pseudonym-based V2V communications schemes rely on certificate generation and signature verification. These schemes require cumbersome key management, frequent updating of certificate chains and other costly procedures such as cryptographic pairings. In this paper, we present novel V2V communications schemes, that provide authentication, authorization, anonymity, non-repudiation, replay protection, pseudonym revocation, and forward secrecy without relying on traditional certificate generation and signature verification. Security and privacy of our schemes rely on hard problems in number theory. Furthermore, our schemes guarantee security and privacy in the presence of subsets of colluding malicious parties, provided that the cardinality of such sets is below a fixed threshold.
