论文标题
区块链采矿的决策问题的游戏方法
Game-theoric approach to decision-making problem for blockchain mining
论文作者
论文摘要
对于区块链网络中的矿工来说，这是一个重要的决策问题。我们将这个决策问题提出为非合作游戏，因为创建块的可能性不仅取决于一个人自己的可用计算资源，还取决于其他矿工的计算资源。通过理论和数值分析，我们根据奖励的奖励和矿工决定的跳跃现象，显示出纳什均衡的滞后现象，这是通过略有变化的奖励。我们还表明，随着矿工数量的增加，矿工决定不参加采矿的奖励变得越来越小。
It is an important decision-making problem for a miner in the blockchain networks if he/she participates in the mining so that he/she earns a reward by creating a new block earlier than other miners. We formulate this decision-making problem as a noncooperative game, because the probability of creating a block depends not only on one's own available computational resources, but also those of other miners. Through theoretical and numerical analyses, we show a hysteresis phenomenon of Nash equilibria depending on the reward and a jump phenomenon of miner decisions by a slight change in reward. We also show that the reward for which miners decide not to participate in the mining becomes smaller as the number of miners increases.
