论文标题
当每个代理人的策略的格式是一种行动时，启示原则都会失败
The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action
论文作者
论文摘要
在机理设计理论中，设计师希望实施一个社交选择功能，为代理商的每个可能的私人类型的每个可能的概况指定了她最喜欢的结果。启示原则断言，如果可以通过平衡机制来实施社会选择功能，那么就会存在一种直接的机制，可以真实地实施它。 本文旨在提出启示原则的失败。我们指出，在任何游戏中，每个代理商策略的格式要么是信息信息，要么是现实的动作，而在许多实际情况下，动作格式非常普遍。 The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism which implements it has action-format strategies, then "\emph{honest and obedient}" will no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism, actually the social choice function can only be implemented "\emph{dishonestly and disobediently}" in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by the direct mechanism.因此，当每个代理人的策略的格式是一种行动时，启示原则就会失败。
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully implement it. This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that in any game the format of each agent's strategy is either an informational message or a realistic action, and the action format is very common in many practical cases. The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism which implements it has action-format strategies, then "\emph{honest and obedient}" will no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism, actually the social choice function can only be implemented "\emph{dishonestly and disobediently}" in Bayesian Nash equilibrium by the direct mechanism. Consequently, the revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action.
