论文标题
具有连接最高的队列策略的排队游戏模型的近似
Approximations for a Queueing Game Model with Join-the-Shortest-Queue Strategy
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了一个可观察到的排队系统，其中每个节点都有专用到达流。有一个额外的到达流，可以通过将客户路由到最短的队列来平衡系统的负载。此外，考虑了奖励成本结构来分析客户的战略行为。对于部分可观察到的平均场极限模型，得出了平衡和社会最佳策略。然后，我们表明从平均场模型获得的策略是具有有限$ n $节点的模型的良好近似值。最后，提供了数值实验来比较平衡和社会最佳行为，包括将概率和社会利益连接到不同的系统参数。
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest queue. In addition, a reward-cost structure is considered to analyze customers' strategic behaviours. The equilibrium and socially optimal strategies are derived for the partially observable mean field limit model. Then, we show that the strategies obtained from the mean field model are good approximations to the model with finite $N$ nodes. Finally, numerical experiments are provided to compare the equilibrium and socially optimal behaviours, including joining probabilities and social benefits for different system parameters.
