论文标题
保护光纤量子量的关键分布源免受光注射攻击
Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
为其安全性，需要在量子密钥分配系统中进行良好保护和表征的来源。不幸的是，该来源很容易受到投射攻击的攻击，例如特洛伊木马，激光种子和激光损伤攻击，其中窃听者会积极地注入明亮的光线以砍掉源单元。黑客激光可能是可以通过激光损伤攻击来修改组件属性的高功率，也进一步帮助Trojan-Horse和其他轻射攻击。在这里，我们提出了针对轻射攻击的对策，该攻击是由放置在源出口处的额外的牺牲组成的组成。该组件应承受高功率传入的光线，同时将其衰减到无法修改其余源的安全水平，或者被破坏为破坏线路的永久性高衰减状态。我们在实验上证明了现成的光纤隔离器和循环器具有这些所需的特性，至少在连续波高功率激光器的攻击下受到攻击。
A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.
