论文标题
游戏理论模型，用于多业排的利润分享
Game Theoretic Models for Profit-Sharing in Multi-fleet Platoons
论文作者
论文摘要
需要在排在排成的情况下进行利润分享，以使竞争运输公司合作组建排。在本文中，我们提出了针对位于相同起源并由竞争运输公司运营的车辆设计的利润分配模型。这些车辆有违约的出发时间，但可以决定在其他时间出发，以便从排队中受益。我们将车辆与游戏理论的战略互动建模，并将纯净的纳什均衡为解决方案概念。在数值评估中，我们比较了与不同利润分布模型相关的游戏结果。
Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same origin and are operated by competing transportation companies. The vehicles have default departure times, but can decide to depart at other times in order to benefit from platooning. We model the strategic interaction among vehicles with game theory and consider pure Nash equilibria as the solution concept. In a numerical evaluation we compare the outcomes of the games associated with different distribution models of the profit.
