论文标题
卖给委托人和预算受限的代理商
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了一个将单个对象出售给想要为公司购买对象的主要代理对的模型。委托人和代理商对对象对公司的价值有不同的评估。代理人是预算约束的，而本金不是。代理人参与了该机制，但她可以（战略性地）将决策委托给校长。我们在二维类型的空间（代理和本金的值）中得出了最大化的机制。我们表明，低于阈值预算，涉及两个发布价格和三个结果（其中一个涉及随机化）的机制是卖方的最佳机制。否则，单个发布的价格机制是最佳的。
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the principal is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) delegate decision-making to the principal. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the principal). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal.
