论文标题
LinkedIn广告市场的竞标代理设计
Bidding Agent Design in the LinkedIn Ad Marketplace
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为在动态在线市场中设计自动招标代理的设计建立了一般优化框架。它仅出于买方的利益而优化，对卖方的拍卖机制不可知。结果，该框架允许跨多个平台的一组广告的联合优化，每个平台都运行自己的拍卖格式。从该框架中得出的竞标策略会自动保证广告单元和平台上预算分配的最佳性。诸如预算交付计划，投资回报和保证结果之类的常见限制直接转化为投标公式中的其他参数。我们根据此框架分享了LinkedIn广告市场中部署的招标系统的实践知识。
We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a result, the framework allows, for instance, the joint optimization of a group of ads across multiple platforms each running its own auction format. Bidding strategy derived from this framework automatically guarantees the optimality of budget allocation across ad units and platforms. Common constraints such as budget delivery schedule, return on investments and guaranteed results, directly translates to additional parameters in the bidding formula. We share practical learnings of the deployed bidding system in the LinkedIn ad marketplace based on this framework.
