论文标题
大数据泄漏的政治经济学:发现逃税的骨骼
The political economy of big data leaks: Uncovering the skeleton of tax evasion
论文作者
论文摘要
在巴拿马公司Mossack Fonseca泄漏了150万个文件后,已经透露了一个复杂的离岸业务实体网络。新兴的情况是合法实体,即个人或公司,涉及离岸活动和交易,同时与几项征税天堂进行交易,这间接建立了有效的逃税国家的有效网络。对该网络的分析在定量上揭示了由法人实体介导的间接相互作用构成全世界逃税的骨骼的间接相互作用的核心(丰富的俱乐部)。有趣的是,Rich-Club主要由众所周知的征服天堂组成,例如英属维尔京群岛和香港,以及中国,俄罗斯,英国和美利坚合众国等主要的全球大国。该分析提供了一种新的方式来对税收天堂进行排名,因为它们在该网络中所发挥的作用,结果要求在税收政策上进行国际协调,考虑到全球化经济中税收逃避者的复杂互连结构。
After the leak of 11.5 million documents from the Panamanian corporation Mossack Fonseca, an intricate network of offshore business entities has been revealed. The emerging picture is that of legal entities, either individuals or companies, involved in offshore activities and transactions with several tax havens simultaneously which establish, indirectly, an effective network of countries acting on tax evasion. The analysis of this network quantitatively uncovers a strongly connected core (a rich-club) of countries whose indirect interactions, mediated by legal entities, form the skeleton for tax evasion worldwide. Intriguingly, the rich-club mainly consists of well-known tax havens such as British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong, and major global powers such as China, Russia, United Kingdom and United States of America. The analysis provides a new way to rank tax havens because of the role they play in this network, and the results call for an international coordination on taxation policies that take into account the complex interconnected structure of tax evaders in a globalized economy.