论文标题
对智能电网的两个最新配对的无证书两方认证的关键协议协议协议的安全分析
Security Analysis of Two Recent Pairing-Free Certificateless Two-Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols for Smart Grid
论文作者
论文摘要
智能电网是智能电力传输网络，可监视和控制通信参与者和网格节点，以确保所有节点之间的信息和电源的双向流。为了保护智能电网，设计关键协议协议非常重要。无配对的无证书两方认证的关键协议协议已被广泛研究并作为基本核心协议，以保护智能电网的安全性。到目前为止，已经提出了各种协议，这些协议不仅在智能电网中，而且在智能城市，医疗保健和车辆临时网络中引入和运行。在本文中，我们分析了两个最近提出的无配对证书的无证书两方认证的关键协议协议协议协议的安全属性。根据我们的分析，这两个方案是不安全的，反对恶意钥匙引发中心的基本模仿攻击，恶意钥匙发生器中心的中间攻击以及钥匙偏移攻击。我们还发现并指出了这些协议的描述中的一些错误。
Smart grids are intelligent power transmission networks that monitor and control communication participants and grid nodes to ensure bidirectional flow of information and power between all nodes. To secure the smart grid, it is very important to design the key agreement protocol. The pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol has been widely studied and applied as a basic core protocol to protect the security of the smart grid. Until now, various protocols have been proposed, and these protocols are being introduced and operated not only in smart grid, but also in smart cities, healthcare, and vehicle ad hoc networks. In this paper, we analyzed the security properties of two recently proposed pairing-free certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocols for Smart grid. According to our analysis, these two protocols are insecure against basic impersonation attacks of malicious key-generator centers, man-in-the-middle attacks of malicious key generator centers, and key offset attacks. We also found and pointed out some errors in the descriptions of these protocols.
