论文标题
贝克曼的多项目多人拍卖的方法
Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑收入最大化贝叶斯拍卖设计的问题，几个竞标者对几个项目具有独立的私人价值观。我们表明，它可以简化为贝克曼（Beckmann，1952）引入的连续最佳运输问题，其中最佳运输流程将熨烫的虚拟估值的概念推广到多项目环境。我们在两个问题与解决方案的存在之间建立了强大的二元性。结果取决于Hart and Reny（2015）的主要化和最佳运输理论的见解以及可行的临时机制的表征。
We consider the problem of revenue-maximizing Bayesian auction design with several bidders having independent private values over several items. We show that it can be reduced to the problem of continuous optimal transportation introduced by Beckmann (1952) where the optimal transportation flow generalizes the concept of ironed virtual valuations to the multi-item setting. We establish the strong duality between the two problems and the existence of solutions. The results rely on insights from majorization and optimal transportation theories and on the characterization of feasible interim mechanisms by Hart and Reny (2015).
