论文标题
TPPD：针对跨核秘密渠道攻击的基于伪划分的防御
TPPD: Targeted Pseudo Partitioning based Defence for Cross-Core Covert Channel Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
当代计算采用缓存层次结构来填补处理器和主要记忆之间的速度差距。为了优化系统性能，所有核心之间共享了最后一个级缓存（LLC）。缓存共享使它们成为跨核正时频道攻击的吸引力。在这些攻击中，在另一个核心上运行的攻击者可以利用受害者进程的访问时间来渗透秘密信息。一种这样的攻击称为跨核秘密通道攻击（CCA）。及时检测，然后预防跨核CCA对于维持用户的完整性和安全性至关重要，尤其是在共享的计算环境中。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种有效的跨核CCA缓解技术。我们建议在目标集合上进行方向缓存分区，只是为了使人怀疑是攻击者。通过这种方式，对整个LLC的性能影响最小化，而良性应用程序可以将LLC充分利用。我们已经使用循环精确的模拟器（GEM5）来分析所提出的方法的每一体及其安全有效性。它已经成功地废除了跨核秘密定时渠道攻击，对良性应用没有显着的性能影响。与现有基于分区的解决方案相比，同时需要0.26％的存储开销，这会减少23％的高速缓存失误。
Contemporary computing employs cache hierarchy to fill the speed gap between processors and main memories. In order to optimise system performance, Last Level Caches(LLC) are shared among all the cores. Cache sharing has made them an attractive surface for cross-core timing channel attacks. In these attacks, an attacker running on another core can exploit the access timing of the victim process to infiltrate the secret information. One such attack is called cross-core Covert Channel Attack (CCA). Timely detection and then prevention of cross-core CCA is critical for maintaining the integrity and security of users, especially in a shared computing environment. In this work, we have proposed an efficient cross-core CCA mitigation technique. We propose a way-wise cache partitioning on targeted sets, only for the processes suspected to be attackers. In this way, the performance impact on the entire LLC is minimised, and benign applications can utilise the LLC to its full capacity. We have used a cycle-accurate simulator (gem5) to analyse the per-formance of the proposed method and its security effectiveness. It has been successful in abolishing the cross-core covert timing channel attack with no significant performance impact on benign applications. It causes 23% less cache misses in comparison to existing partitioning based solutions while requiring 0.26% storage overhead.
