论文标题
确保不可保险的收入
Insuring uninsurable income
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究具有私人观察到的特质收入的纯交换经济中的动态机制设计。经典的隐藏收入合同仅以医职为代价才能达到限制的效率（Green 1987； Thomas-Worrall 1990）。我们提出了一种由Marcet-Marimon（1992）改编的简单递归机制，该机制将每个收入向前转移一个时期，将有望的公用事业保持在有限的集合中，并且在透明的“中等风险减轻”条件下，均提供了顺序的效率。在固定的重叠生成环境中，我们进一步提供了确保预算可持续性的最初承诺的明确条件；早期的队列预基金会跨期的平滑，因此每个队列的预期终身用途都比自动降低。我们的分析使用单个状态（承诺的实用程序），封闭形式的转移和Bellman验证。
We study dynamic mechanism design in a pure-exchange economy with privately observed idiosyncratic income. Classic hidden-income contracts attain constrained efficiency only at the cost of immiseration (Green 1987; Thomas-Worrall 1990). We propose a simple recursive mechanism adapted from Marcet-Marimon (1992) that shifts each income shock forward by one period, keeps promised utilities in a bounded set, and, under a transparent ``moderate risk-aversion'' condition, delivers sequential efficiency. In a stationary overlapping-generations setting, we further provide an explicit condition on the initial promise that ensures budget sustainability; early cohorts pre-fund intertemporal smoothing so that every cohort attains a higher expected lifetime utility than under autarky. Our analysis uses a single state (promised utility), closed-form transfers, and a Bellman verification.
