论文标题
用于控制具有安全保证的网络物理系统控制合成的分析框架
An Analytical Framework for Control Synthesis of Cyber-Physical Systems with Safety Guarantee
论文作者
论文摘要
需要在错误和恶意攻击下安全操作的网络物理系统（CPS）。单纯形架构和最近提出的网络弹性架构，例如拜占庭式容错++（BFT ++），分别为CPS提供了在断层和恶意网络攻击下的安全性。但是，这些现有的架构利用不同的时序参数和实现来提供安全性，并且似乎无关。在本文中，我们提出了一个分析框架，以代表单纯形，BFT ++和其他实用的网络弹性体系结构（CRA）。我们构建了一个混合系统，该系统对CP进行了建模，该系统采用了这些架构中的任何一个。我们通过建议的框架得出足够的条件，在该框架下，保证控制政策是安全的。我们提出了一种算法来综合控制策略。我们使用有关波音747的横向控制的案例研究来验证提出的框架，并证明我们提出的方法可确保系统的安全。
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are required to operate safely under fault and malicious attacks. The simplex architecture and the recently proposed cyber resilient architectures, e.g., Byzantine fault tolerant++ (BFT++), provide safety for CPS under faults and malicious cyber attacks, respectively. However, these existing architectures make use of different timing parameters and implementations to provide safety, and are seemingly unrelated. In this paper, we propose an analytical framework to represent the simplex, BFT++ and other practical cyber resilient architectures (CRAs). We construct a hybrid system that models CPS adopting any of these architectures. We derive sufficient conditions via our proposed framework under which a control policy is guaranteed to be safe. We present an algorithm to synthesize the control policy. We validate the proposed framework using a case study on lateral control of a Boeing 747, and demonstrate that our proposed approach ensures safety of the system.
