论文标题
只有存在的东西可能引起：自由意志的内在观点
Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic view of free will
论文作者
论文摘要
本文解决了自由意志的综合信息理论（IIT）的含义。 IIT是一种理论，说明什么是意识和拥有的理论。根据IIT的说法，意识的存在是由大脑中的最大原因效应所解释的。此外，特定体验的感觉是通过如何结构的原因来解释的。如果IIT是对的，那么我们确实有自由意志在基本意义上：我们有真正的选择，我们做出真正的决定，而不是我们的神经元或原子 - 是我们意志行动的真正原因，对他们负有真正的责任。 IIT对真正的自由意志的论点取决于对意识的正确理解，这是由其内在能力本体论所捕获的：从物理上讲，真正存在的是内在的实体，只有真正存在的东西才能引起。
This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and what it takes to have it. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way specific experiences feel is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in the fundamental sense: we have true alternatives, we make true decisions, and we - not our neurons or atoms - are the true cause of our willed actions and bear true responsibility for them. IIT's argument for true free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as true existence, as captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what truly exists, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what truly exists can cause.
