论文标题
锅中的闪光灯（bot）：测量私人池中最大可提取值
A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools
论文作者
论文摘要
以太坊的兴起导致了一个蓬勃发展的分散市场，不幸的是，这已经成为领先且最大的可提取价值（MEV）活动的受害者，在该活动中，精明的参与者游戏交易订购范围内的盈利范围内。解决此类行为的一种流行解决方案是Flashbots，这是一个具有基础架构和设计目标的私人池，旨在消除与MEV相关的负面外部性。尽管Flashbots建立了值得称赞的目标来解决MEV行为，但尚未提供证据表明这些目标是在实践中实现的。 在本文中，我们衡量了Flashbot的受欢迎程度，并评估它是否达到了其特许目标。我们发现（1）Flashbots Miners在以太坊网络中占99.9％以上，（2）强大的矿工在使用Flashbots之前所做的工作超过$ 2 \ times $，而非米纳斯的馅饼的切片相当地缩水，（3）挖掘的挖掘与flash的同时相当于flashbots，而不是90％的flashbots，而不是90％的flashbots，而不是90％的flashbots，并且是90％）。以太坊中，超过80％的MEV提取是通过Flashbot进行的，有13.2％来自其他私人游泳池。
The rise of Ethereum has lead to a flourishing decentralized marketplace that has, unfortunately, fallen victim to frontrunning and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) activities, where savvy participants game transaction orderings within a block for profit. One popular solution to address such behavior is Flashbots, a private pool with infrastructure and design goals aimed at eliminating the negative externalities associated with MEV. While Flashbots has established laudable goals to address MEV behavior, no evidence has been provided to show that these goals are achieved in practice. In this paper, we measure the popularity of Flashbots and evaluate if it is meeting its chartered goals. We find that (1) Flashbots miners account for over 99.9% of the hashing power in the Ethereum network, (2) powerful miners are making more than $2\times$ what they were making prior to using Flashbots, while non-miners' slice of the pie has shrunk commensurately, (3) mining is just as centralized as it was prior to Flashbots with more than 90% of Flashbots blocks coming from just two miners, and (4) while more than 80% of MEV extraction in Ethereum is happening through Flashbots, 13.2% is coming from other private pools.
