论文标题
异步GPS欺骗大量消费者GNSS接收器的功效
Efficacy of Asynchronous GPS Spoofing Against High Volume Consumer GNSS Receivers
论文作者
论文摘要
全球定位系统（GPS）对欺骗的脆弱性已有一段时间了。同样，大多数半自治和自动无人机的定位和导航取决于全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）信号。在先前的工作中，发现对L1 GPS或GNSS依赖的商业无人机的简单，有效且有效的网络攻击发现简单或异步的GPS欺骗是一种简单，高效且有效的网络攻击。在本文中，首先，我们对先前研究文献中提出的无人机发作的异步GPS进行了一些重要的观察。然后，我们设计了异步的GPS欺骗攻击计划。接下来，我们在各种条件下对不同功能和商用无人机（DJI MAVIC 2 PRO）的这种攻击对GNSS接收器（基于Android手机的大量消费设备）的有效性。最后，我们根据测试的结果提出了几种新颖的见解。
The vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS) against spoofing is known for quite some time. Also, the positioning and navigation of most semi-autonomous and autonomous drones are dependent on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. In prior work, simplistic or asynchronous GPS spoofing was found to be a simple, efficient, and effective cyber attack against L1 GPS or GNSS dependent commercial drones. In this paper, first we make some important observations on asynchronous GPS spoofing attacks on drones presented in prior research literature. Then, we design an asynchronous GPS spoofing attack plan. Next, we test the effectiveness of this attack against GNSS receivers (high volume consumer devices based on Android mobile phones) of different capabilities and a commercial drone (DJI Mavic 2 Pro) under various conditions. Finally, we present several novel insights based on the results of the tests.
