论文标题
零和游戏涉及团队对抗团队的零游戏：平衡的存在，以及信息的比较和规律性
Zero-Sum Games involving Teams against Teams: Existence of Equilibria, and Comparison and Regularity in Information
论文作者
论文摘要
许多新兴问题涉及参加游戏的代理团队。此类问题需要就属于给定团队的代理人之间的相关结构进行随机分析。在标准的Borel空间的背景下，本文为参加零和游戏的两个有限的代理人做出了以下贡献：（i）在零和比赛中，将为零和均衡的团队中的团队中的团队中的团队中的团队中的零和平衡中的存在结果提出，以对每个团队进行了对策略衡量的条件进行分析，以分析具有策略性衡量的条件。 （ii）Blackwell的信息结构的订购被推广到具有标准Borel空间的$ n $播放器团队，其中将相关的信息结构插入作为关键属性； （iii）基于此结果，布莱克韦尔（Blackwell）的信息结构的订购是针对团队零和零和游戏问题的。 （iv）最后，在总变化下，在信息结构的空间中，团队合作团队零和游戏问题的平衡值的连续性得到了连续性。
Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces, this paper makes the following contributions for two teams of finitely many agents taking part in a zero-sum game: (i) An existence result will be presented for saddle-point equilibria in zero-sum games involving teams against teams when common randomness is assumed to be available in each team with an analysis on conditions for compactness of strategic team measures to be presented. (ii) Blackwell's ordering of information structures is generalized to $n$-player teams with standard Borel spaces, where correlated garbling of information structures is introduced as a key attribute; (iii) building on this result Blackwell's ordering of information structures is established for team-against-team zero-sum game problems. (iv) Finally, continuity of the equilibrium value of team-against-team zero-sum game problems in the space of information structures under total variation is established.
