论文标题

通过零散的联合学习增强安全性和隐私

Enhanced Security and Privacy via Fragmented Federated Learning

论文作者

Jebreel, Najeeb Moharram, Domingo-Ferrer, Josep, Blanco-Justicia, Alberto, Sanchez, David

论文摘要

在联合学习(FL)中,一组参与者共享与将更新结合到全局模型中的聚合服务器在本地数据上计算的更新。但是,将准确性与隐私和安全性核对是FL的挑战。一方面,诚实参与者发送的良好更新可能会揭示其私人本地信息,而恶意参与者发送的中毒更新可能会损害模型的可用性和/或完整性。另一方面,通过更新失真赔偿的准确性增强隐私,而通过更新聚合损坏安全性,因为它不允许服务器过滤单个中毒更新。为了解决准确性私人关系冲突,我们提出{\ em碎片的联合学习}(FFL),其中参与者在将其发送到服务器之前,随机交换并混合其更新的片段。为了获得隐私,我们设计了一个轻巧的协议,该协议允许参与者私下交换和混合其更新的加密片段,以便服务器既不能获得单个更新,也不能将其链接到其发起人。为了实现安全性,我们设计了一个针对FFL量身定制的基于声誉的防御,该防御根据他们交换的片段质量以及他们发送的混合更新来建立对参与者的信任及其混合更新。由于交换的片段的参数可以保持其原始坐标,并且可以对攻击者进行中和,因此服务器可以从接收到的混合更新中正确重建全局模型而不会准确损失。四个真实数据集的实验表明,FFL可以防止半honest服务器安装隐私攻击,可以有效地抵抗中毒攻击,并可以保持全局模型的准确性。

In federated learning (FL), a set of participants share updates computed on their local data with an aggregator server that combines updates into a global model. However, reconciling accuracy with privacy and security is a challenge to FL. On the one hand, good updates sent by honest participants may reveal their private local information, whereas poisoned updates sent by malicious participants may compromise the model's availability and/or integrity. On the other hand, enhancing privacy via update distortion damages accuracy, whereas doing so via update aggregation damages security because it does not allow the server to filter out individual poisoned updates. To tackle the accuracy-privacy-security conflict, we propose {\em fragmented federated learning} (FFL), in which participants randomly exchange and mix fragments of their updates before sending them to the server. To achieve privacy, we design a lightweight protocol that allows participants to privately exchange and mix encrypted fragments of their updates so that the server can neither obtain individual updates nor link them to their originators. To achieve security, we design a reputation-based defense tailored for FFL that builds trust in participants and their mixed updates based on the quality of the fragments they exchange and the mixed updates they send. Since the exchanged fragments' parameters keep their original coordinates and attackers can be neutralized, the server can correctly reconstruct a global model from the received mixed updates without accuracy loss. Experiments on four real data sets show that FFL can prevent semi-honest servers from mounting privacy attacks, can effectively counter poisoning attacks and can keep the accuracy of the global model.

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