论文标题
非诱使资源的动态定价：设计多维区块链费用市场
Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
公共区块链实施收费机制，以在竞争交易中分配稀缺的计算资源。大多数现有的费用市场设计都利用一个联合，可函数的帐户单位（例如以太坊中的气体）通过硬编码相对价格来定价其他不可杀伤的资源，例如带宽，计算和存储。以这种方式确定每个资源的相对价格会抑制颗粒价格发现，限制可伸缩性并打开拒绝服务攻击的可能性。结果，以太坊和Solana等许多著名网络提出了多维费市场。在本文中，我们提供了一种原则性的方式，用于设计有效地定价多个不可避免资源的费用市场。从网络设计师指定的损失函数开始，我们将展示如何计算网络激励措施（以最大程度地减少损失）与用户和矿工的动力（以最大程度地提高其福利），即使对这些资源的需求变化，也是如此。我们的定价机制将网络设计师问题的自然分解归功于通过资源价格相互关联的两个部分。这些结果可用于有效设置费用以提高网络性能。
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multi-dimensional fee markets. In this paper, we provide a principled way to design fee markets that efficiently price multiple non-fungible resources. Starting from a loss function specified by the network designer, we show how to compute dynamic prices that align the network's incentives (to minimize the loss) with those of the users and miners (to maximize their welfare), even as demand for these resources changes. Our pricing mechanism follows from a natural decomposition of the network designer's problem into two parts that are related to each other via the resource prices. These results can be used to efficiently set fees in order to improve network performance.
