论文标题
具有等级的多维机制：相同对象和异构对象模型之间的等效性
Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
论文作者
论文摘要
我们表明，向具有前对称和加性值的买家出售多个，异质物体的垄断者的机理设计问题等同于机理设计问题，用于将相同对象销售给买方的垄断者的机制问题。我们为相同的对象模型得出了三个新的结果：（i）一种随机机制的收入单调性的新条件，（ii）对先验的足够条件，使得最佳确定性机制中的价格没有上涨，并且（iii）简化了确定性机制的激励性约束。我们使用等效性在异质对象模型中建立相应的结果。
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.
