论文标题
许多世界解释中的自由
Freedom in the many-worlds interpretation
论文作者
论文摘要
我分析了许多世界解释（MWI）中自由意志的可能性，认为它们的兼容性。 I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin's "The Multiverse Pandemic" (preprint arXiv:2210.05377, after Gisin, N., "L'épidémie du multivers", in "Le Plus Grand des Hasards", Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will.他提出的计数是： （1）MWI是确定性的，强迫我们选择， （2）在MWI中，我们所有可能的选择都会发生，并且 （3）MWI限制了创造力，因为一切都与其他一切纠缠在一起。 我认为，MWI的每个特征实际上与看起来比看起来更多的自由兼容。特别是，MWI允许兼容自由意志，但也很像Chisholm定义的自由主义者自由意志。我认为，从物理的角度来看，替代选择存在为可能性没有意义的立场，但MWI为替代方案提供了物理基础。
I analyze the possibility of free-will in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), arguing for their compatibility. I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin's "The Multiverse Pandemic" (preprint arXiv:2210.05377, after Gisin, N., "L'épidémie du multivers", in "Le Plus Grand des Hasards", Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will. The counts he raised are: (1) MWI is deterministic, forcing choices on us, (2) in MWI all our possible choices happen, and (3) MWI limits creativity, because everything is entangled with everything else. I argue that each of these features of MWI is in fact compatible with more freedom than it may seem. In particular, MWI allows compatibilist free-will, but also free-will very much like the libertarian free-will defined by Chisholm. I argue that the position that alternative choices exist as possibilities does not make sense from a physical point of view, but MWI offers a physical ground for alternatives.
