论文标题
加权简单游戏和简单综合体的拓扑
Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes
论文作者
论文摘要
我们使用简单的复合物来建模简单的游戏以及加权投票游戏，在这些游戏中，某些联盟被认为是不可能的。提供了简单游戏中各种想法的拓扑特征，Banzhaf和Shapley-Shubik Power索引的表达方式也是加权游戏的。我们计算了与不可行的联盟加权投票游戏的几个例子，包括美国选举学院和波斯尼亚 - 黑塞哥维那议会。
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted games. We calculate the indices in several examples of weighted voting games with unfeasible coalitions, including the U.S. Electoral College and the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
