学术文献库

The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) opens up new opportunities for on-demand service provisioning anywhere and anytime, but also exposes UAVs to a variety of cyber threats. Low/medium interaction honeypots offer a promising lightweight defense for actively protecting mobile Internet of things, particularly UAV networks. While previous research has primarily focused on honeypot system design and attack pattern recognition, the incentive issue for motivating UAV's participation (e.g., sharing trapped attack data in honeypots) to collaboratively resist distributed and sophisticated attacks remains unexplored. This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical collaborative defense approach to address optimal, fair, and feasible incentive design, in the presence of network dynamics and UAVs' multi-dimensional private information (e.g., valid defense data (VDD) volume, communication delay, and UAV cost). Specifically, we first develop a honeypot game between UAVs and the network operator under both partial and complete information asymmetry scenarios. The optimal VDD-reward contract design problem with partial information asymmetry is then solved using a contract-theoretic approach that ensures budget feasibility, truthfulness, fairness, and computational efficiency. In addition, under complete information asymmetry, we devise a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm to dynamically design optimal contracts for distinct types of UAVs in the time-varying UAV network. Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed scheme can motivate UAV's cooperation in VDD sharing and improve defensive effectiveness, compared with conventional schemes.