论文标题
集体模式和婚姻市场
Collective models and the marriage market
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我为集体模型和婚姻市场的匹配模型开发了一种综合方法。在集体框架中，家庭形成和家庭内部的议价能力分配均被视为给定的。在当前的贡献中不再是这种情况，在这种贡献中，这两者都是确定婚姻市场平衡的内源性。我表征了一类“适当”的集体模型，这些模型可以嵌入具有不完美可转移实用程序的一般匹配框架中。在这样的模型中，讨价还价集由称为距离函数的分析设备进行参数化，该设备在写下通常的稳定性条件和估计中起着关键作用。但是，通常，距离功能在闭合形式中尚不清楚。我为计算距离函数提供了有效的方法，即使与最复杂的集体模型一起使用。最后，我使用PSID数据提供了一个完整的应用程序。我确定了共享规则及其分布，并研究了自1969年以来在美国共享的分享规则和家务时间的演变。在反事实实验中，我模拟了缩小性别工资差距的影响。
In this paper, I develop an integrated approach to collective models and matching models of the marriage market. In the collective framework, both household formation and the intra-household allocation of bargaining power are taken as given. This is no longer the case in the present contribution, where both are endogenous to the determination of equilibrium on the marriage market. I characterize a class of "proper" collective models which can be embedded into a general matching framework with imperfectly transferable utility. In such models, the bargaining sets are parametrized by an analytical device called distance function, which plays a key role both for writing down the usual stability conditions and for estimation. In general, however, distance functions are not known in closed-form. I provide an efficient method for computing distance functions, that works even with the most complex collective models. Finally, I provide a fully-fledged application using PSID data. I identify the sharing rule and its distribution and study the evolution of the sharing rule and housework time sharing in the United States since 1969. In a counterfactual experiment, I simulate the impact of closing the gender wage gap.
