论文标题
不确定性的德克萨斯枪战
The Texas Shootout under Uncertainty
论文作者
论文摘要
我们使用德克萨斯州的枪战机制和私人估值调查了一家共同拥有的公司向单个所有者分配。我们确定骑士对同龄人的分布的不确定性，这是其过早溶解的威慑作用的原因。通过分销频段围绕参考分布$ f $对不确定性进行建模，我们得出了歧义性偏见的最佳价格公告。针对$ f $中位数的估值的不确定性的分隔物对冲，同时提取了高估和低估值的预期盈余。该机制的结果对于围绕中位数的估值有效。风险中立的共同所有者更喜欢成为选择者，甚至严格来说，对于低水平的不确定性和高度不确定性下的极端估值而言，任何估值也是如此。如果认为估值是接近的，那么该机制始终是高效并减少过早溶解所需的不确定性。
We investigate the allocation of a co-owned company to a single owner using the Texas Shoot-Out mechanism with private valuations. We identify Knightian Uncertainty about the peer's distribution as a reason for its deterrent effect of a premature dissolving. Modeling uncertainty by a distribution band around a reference distribution $F$, we derive the optimal price announcement for an ambiguity averse divider. The divider hedges against uncertainty for valuations close to the median of $F$, while extracting expected surplus for high and low valuations. The outcome of the mechanism is efficient for valuations around the median. A risk neutral co-owner prefers to be the chooser, even strictly so for any valuation under low levels of uncertainty and for extreme valuations under high levels of uncertainty. If valuations are believed to be close, less uncertainty is required for the mechanism to always be efficient and reduce premature dissolvements.
