论文标题
拍卖的收入比较与歧义性差异卖方
Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers
论文作者
论文摘要
当卖方具有Maxmin预期效用偏好时，我们研究了拍卖的收入比较问题。卖方围绕某种参考信念持有一组先验，被解释为真实概率定律或焦点分布的近似模型。我们开发了一种比较拍卖收入表现的方法：卖方喜欢拍卖X而不是拍卖y，如果其转移功能满足了单跨条件的弱形式。 Intuitively, this condition means that a bidder's payment is more negatively associated with the competitor's type in X than in Y. Applying this methodology, we show that when the reference belief is independent and identically distributed (IID) and the bidders are ambiguity neutral, (i) the first-price auction outperforms the second-price and all-pay auctions, and (ii) the second-price and all-pay auctions outperform the war of attrition.我们的方法学得出的结果与链接原理的结果相反。
We study the revenue comparison problem of auctions when the seller has a maxmin expected utility preference. The seller holds a set of priors around some reference belief, interpreted as an approximating model of the true probability law or the focal point distribution. We develop a methodology for comparing the revenue performances of auctions: the seller prefers auction X to auction Y if their transfer functions satisfy a weak form of the single-crossing condition. Intuitively, this condition means that a bidder's payment is more negatively associated with the competitor's type in X than in Y. Applying this methodology, we show that when the reference belief is independent and identically distributed (IID) and the bidders are ambiguity neutral, (i) the first-price auction outperforms the second-price and all-pay auctions, and (ii) the second-price and all-pay auctions outperform the war of attrition. Our methodology yields results opposite to those of the Linkage Principle.
