论文标题
无限服务队列中的平衡，社会福利和收入
Equilibrium, social welfare, and revenue in an infinite-server queue
论文作者
论文摘要
受新兴技术对收费公园的影响的促进，本文研究了无限服务队列的平衡，社会福利和收入的问题。更具体地说，我们假设客户的效用包括获得服务的积极奖励，从而减去系统中其他客户造成的成本。在可观察到的环境中，我们分别显示了个人阈值，社会最佳阈值和最佳收入阈值的存在，独特性和表达。然后，我们证明，最佳收入阈值小于社会最佳阈值，该阈值比单个小的阈值小。此外，我们还将成本函数扩展到具有非负系数的任何有限多项式函数。在不可观察的环境中，我们得出了个人和最佳收入的连接概率。最后，使用数值实验，我们补充了结果，并比较了这两个信息水平下的社会福利和收入。
Motivated by the impact of emerging technologies on toll parks, this paper studies a problem of equilibrium, social welfare, and revenue for an infinite-server queue. More specifically, we assume that a customer's utility consists of a positive reward for receiving service minus a cost caused by the other customers in the system. In the observable setting, we show the existence, uniqueness, and expressions of the individual threshold, the socially optimal threshold, and the optimal revenue threshold, respectively. Then, we prove that the optimal revenue threshold is smaller than the socially optimal threshold, which is smaller than the individual one. Furthermore, we also extend the cost functions to any finite polynomial function with non-negative coefficients. In the unobservable setting, we derive the joining probabilities of individual and optimal revenue. Finally, using numerical experiments, we complement our results and compare the social welfare and the revenue under these two information levels.
