论文标题
法规制度对Chinext IPO的影响:2013年和2020年改革对定价和反应过度的影响
The Impact of Regulation Regime Changes on ChiNext IPOs: Effects of 2013 and 2020 Reforms on Pricing and Overreaction
论文作者
论文摘要
自就职典礼以来,Chinext经历了三个时间段,并具有两个不同的法规制度和三套不同的上市交易限制。本文研究了法规制度和上市日交易限制对Chinext IPO的初始回报的影响。我们假设Chinext IPO的初始回报包含发行人的内在价值,而投资者过度反应。固有值由IPOS 21日回报(每月收益)表示,每月和初始收益(内部回报)之间的差异是反应过度反应的代理。我们发现,所有三个时间段的所有三个回报的所有重要变量都属于四类:列出前的需求,上市后需求,市场状况,市场状况和上市前的发行人价值。我们观察到三个时期内每个回报的可变类别之间的对比,这揭示了投资者行为在法规制度的发展方面的发展。根据我们的发现,我们认为,在不同时间段内的初始回报,每月回报(内在价值)和后期回报(过度反应)之间的差异和决定因素之间的差异可以在很大程度上通过沿两个维度的调节制度变化来解释:1)批准vs.注册vs.注册和2)列出日交易日交易限制和返回限制。我们发现IPO定价是根据批准制度驱动的,但根据注册制度进行了价值驱动。我们进一步比较了法规制度变更对Chinext IPO定价实践的影响,并提出了关于Chinext IPO定价效率的未来研究计划与政策含义。
Since its inauguration, ChiNext has gone through three time periods with two different regulation regimes and three different sets of listing day trading restrictions. This paper studies the impact of regulation regimes and listing day trading restrictions on the initial return of ChiNext IPOs. We hypothesize that the initial return of a ChiNext IPO contains the issuers intrinsic value and the investors overreaction. The intrinsic value is represented by the IPOs 21st day return (monthly return), and the difference between the monthly and initial returns (intramonth return) is a proxy of the overreaction. We find that all significant variables for all three returns in all three time periods fall into four categories: pre-listing demand, post-listing demand, market condition and pre-listing issuer value. We observe stark contrasts among variable categories for each of the returns in the three time periods, which reveals an evolution of the investors behavior with regard to the progression of regulation regimes. Based on our findings, we argue that the differences among the levels and determinants of initial return, monthly return (intrinsic value) and intramonth return (overreaction) in different time periods can be largely explained by regulation regime changes along two dimensions: 1) approval vs. registration and 2) listing day trading curbs and return limits. We find that IPO pricing is demand-driven under the approval regime, but value-driven under the registration regime. We further compare the impact of regulation regime changes on ChiNext IPO pricing practice, and propose a future research plan on ChiNext IPO pricing efficiency with policy implication.