论文标题
为Stablecoin货币政策设计自主市场
Designing Autonomous Markets for Stablecoin Monetary Policy
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了一种新型的自动化做市商(AMM),有助于保持稳定的稳定性和长期生存能力。该主要市场AMM(P-AMM)是一种自治机制,用于在所有可能的状态下施工和赎回Stablecoins,旨在实现几种理想的特性。我们首先介绍了当前的临时发行和赎回机制的几个案例研究,其中几种促成了最近的稳定蛋白,并为支持稳定性和可用性的P-AMM的理想特性提出了理想的特性。然后,我们设计了P-AMM赎回曲线,并表明它满足了这些属性,包括协议和Stablecoin持有人的有限损失。我们进一步表明,这种救赎曲线是独立的路径,并且具有涉及交易费用和单独的铸造曲线的扩展设置中路径缺陷的特性。这意味着,系统健康相对于任何交易曲线的独立路径独立设置而薄弱,并且没有动力从战略上进行细分赎回。最后,我们展示了如何有效地实现P-amm的链链。
We develop a new type of automated market maker (AMM) that helps to maintain stability and long-term viability in a stablecoin. This primary market AMM (P-AMM) is an autonomous mechanism for pricing minting and redemption of stablecoins in all possible states and is designed to achieve several desirable properties. We first cover several case studies of current ad hoc stablecoin issuance and redemption mechanisms, several of which have contributed to recent stablecoin de-peggings, and formulate desirable properties of a P-AMM that support stability and usability. We then design a P-AMM redemption curve and show that it satisfies these properties, including bounded loss for both the protocol and stablecoin holders. We further show that this redemption curve is path independent and has properties of path deficiency in extended settings involving trading fees and a separate minting curve. This means that system health weakly improves relative to the path independent setting along any trading curve and that there is no incentive to strategically subdivide redemptions. Finally, we show how to implement the P-AMM efficiently on-chain.